Etiqueta: Competencia

Consejeros y Derecho de la Competencia. Jessup v., Alphabet/ UE, v Google

Se daba noticia hace poco de la interposición de una acción derivativa contra Alphabet, la holding del grupo Google: Robert Jessup v. Larry Page et al., case number CIV538782, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo.) Este tipo de acciones contra administradores (y altos ejecutivos) a favor de la entidad administrada se formularía en Jessup v Alphabet por incumplimiento del deber de vigilancia de administradores, habitualmente y normalmente comprendido en el Duty of Care o entre nosotros en el Deber de Diligencia en su sentido fiduciario más amplio, en relación con no haber propiciado un comportamiento responsable de Google en materia de Defensa de la Competencia en la Unión Eupopea

El fondo de la cuestión enlaza con una investigación de la Comisión Europea sobre Google. Google desarrolla los sistemas operativos Android, mayoritariamente instalados en los teléfonos y dispositivos móvile en la UE. Si Android es un dispositivo «abierto», desarrollable por terceros, Google incorpora aplicaciones protegidas por propiedad intelectual. Estas circunstancias dieron lugar a la apertura de investigaciones por parte de la Comisión Europea, formalizadas el 15.04.2015. Las bases jurídicas de una posible sanción serían el Art 101 TFUE, el Art 102 TFUE, el Art 11.6 Reglamento 1/2003

Ya en casa, y para entender las posibles repercusiones domésticas de una generalización de la exigencia de responsabilidad por supuestos anticompetitivos remitimos a la ilustrada entrada en su blog del Prf  Fernando Díz Estella, conocida gracias a @AntonioRoblesML

Esta acción fue acumulada con otras 4, declarándose competente para conocerlas los tribunales de Santa Clara

 

Más:

International Business Law (International Trade Degree-ULE). Lesson 3 (2) . Notes IBL

Lesson 3 (2).  Unfair competition

Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), defines the commercial practices which are prohibited in the European Union (EU). It thus protects the economic interests of consumers, competitors and markets before, during and after a commercial transaction has taken place.

      • The Directive has been amended by Directive (EU) 2019/2161 of 27 November 2019 on better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules, part of the ‘New Deal for Consumers”
  1. The framework for Unfair Competition in the EU, sets out a GENERAL CLAUSE in accordance to which Unfair Commercial Practices are those which:
                    • do not comply with the requirements of professional diligence, and
                    • are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer.

2. It also grants SPECIAL PROTECTION TO SOME POPULATION GROUPS which are especially vulnerable  (because of their age -children, elderly-, credulity,  mental or physical illness, etc.)

3. The Directives also  DEFINE TWO SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES: misleading practices (by action or omission) and aggressive practices.

I- MISLEADING PRACTICES

          1. By action. A practice is misleading if it contains false or untrue information or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even though the information given may be correct, and is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise. Examples of such actions include false or deceiving information on:
                • the existence or nature of the product;
                • the main characteristics of the product (its availability, benefits, risks, composition, geographical origin, results to be expected from its use, etc.);
                • the extent of the trader’s commitments;
                • the price or the existence of a specific price advantage;
                • the need for a service, or repair.

B.  By omission. Such occur when material information that the average consumer needs to make an informed transactional decision is omitted or provided in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner and thereby causes (or might cause) that consumer to take a purchase decision that he or she would not have otherwise taken.To evaluate such «omissions»  the context is taken into account,

II.- AGGRESSIVE COMMERCIAL PRACTICES

On the one hand, and in accordance with this legal EU framework, several elements must be taken into consideration in order to determine whether an aggressive commercial practice occurs:

        • the nature, location and duration of the aggressive practice;
        • the use of threatening or abusive language or behaviour;
        • the exploitation by the trader of any specific circumstance affecting the consumer in order to influence his/her decision;
        • any disproportionate non-contractual conditions imposed on the consumer who wishes to exercise his/her contractual rights (such as to terminate or switch a contract).

On the other hand, a number of practices are directly classified as aggressive because they are included in a «blacklist” within the Directive. Annexe I to the Directive contains a list of 31 commercial practices which should be considered unfair in all circumstances.

  • In Spain, the Directive was transposed by Law 3/91, which has been modified. Please find here the consolidated version on the Spanish Law

International Business Law (International Trade Degree-ULE). Lesson 3 (1-4) . Notes IBL

Lesson 3 (1-4). State Aid

State aid is an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings/business by national public authorities. Thus, this excludes subsidies granted to individuals or general measures open to all enterprises (for example, taxation measures or employment legislation applicable to all business).

Features of State Aid:

  • intervention by the State or through State resources which can take a variety of forms (e.g. grants, interest and tax reliefs, guarantees, government holdings of all or part of a company, or providing goods and services on preferential terms, etc.);
  • it  gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis, for example to specific companies or industry sectors, or to companies located in specific regions
  • competition has been or may be distorted;
  • the intervention is likely to affect trade between the Member States.

Despite the prohibition, some State Aid is compatible or maybe admissible in accordance with the Treaties (TFUE) and in accordance with secondary legislation (in particular Regulations,Decisions).

A) TREATIES (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU)

  • Automatic compatibility: 107, paragraph 2 allows for compatibility with the internal market (as it has been repeatedly declared by the case-law of the TJUE) of:
    • State Aid of a social nature granted to individual consumers provided that it is granted without discrimination as to the origin of the products;
    • State Aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences;
    • State Aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious unemployment;
  • Compatible if declared by the EU Commission. Article 107, paragraph 3 adds that some other types of State Aid may be considered compatible with the internal market (following a procedure of application to the Commission as explained hereinafter). :
    • State Aid to implement an important project of common European interest,
    • State Aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent contrary to the common interest
    • State Aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent contrary to the common interest

B) SECONDARY LEGISLATION.

B.1 Under various EU exiting Regulations, State Aid  «EXCEPTIONS BY CATEGORIES» has been allowed in areas such as

  • Aid for training
  • De minimis aid
  • Aid for small and medium-sized enterprises

The procedure for exemptions by categories include Council Regulations that declare some categories exempted; and Commission Regulations developing the categories of State aid that the Council has already determined may be exempted

B.2 Under Commission Regulation 800/2008 a wide number of categories of aid were declared compatible. It consolidated previous Regulations and added categories of permitted State aid which, being included in it, are not subject to the obligation of prior notification to the Commission. 

This Regulation exempts aids (in the simplified procedure that it introduced) are related to:

  • Investment and employment aid for SMEs
  • Aid for business start-ups by women entrepreneurs
  • Environmental aid
  • Aid in favour of consultancy for SMEs and their participation in trade fairs
  • Aid in the form of risk capital
  • Aid for research, development and innovation
  • Aid for training
  • Aid for disadvantaged or disabled workers

In order to be exempted from the notification requirement, the State resolutions granting aid must always refer to R 800/2008, comply with the maximum aid intensities laid down in that Regulation for each category, and subsidise only the «eligible» costs in the Regulation. In addition, such aid must have an «incentive» effect, i.e. serve as an incentive to develop certain activities or projects.

The 2013 revision of the State aid Procedural Regulation introduced the possibility of conducting State aid sector inquiries by the EU Commission, (before it was only possible as part of Antitrust and Merger control). State aid sector inquiries can be launched when State aid measures may distort competition in more than one  Member States, or where existing aid measures are no longer compatible with the regulatory framework.

(C) INDIVIDUAL EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL PROHIBITION OF STATE AID. States wishing to grant State aid which is not among those declared compatible by the Treaties or by Regulation can issue an application to the EU Commission. On application by a Member State, the Council may act unanimously, decide that aid which that State is granting or intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with the internal market

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF STATE AIDS. 

  • Articles 108 and 109 establish that the Commission shall, in cooperation with the Member States, keep under constant review all systems of aid existing in those States, and the Commission shall propose to the MS appropriate measures.
  • The EU Commission has strong investigative and decision-making powers. Central to it is the notification procedure which MS have to follow:
    • The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.
    • The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision. However, if State Aid is granted and the Commission finds that aid already granted by a State or through State resources is not compatible with the internal market or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of time to be determined by the Commission.
    • If the State concerned does not comply in time, the Commission or any other interested State may refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union direct. (CJEU)/TJUE.

 

Competition Law. Concentrations (EU). Notes for IBL

Lesson 3 (II). Free competition law. Concentrations (1.3)

Introduction to concentrations of companies/firms from the perspective of Free Competition Law

A ‘concentration’ is the legal combination of two or more firms/companies. It can be attained in different ways, ie:  by merger or acquisition, by the implementation of a business strategy that results in a  change of control on a lasting basis, etc. The following are ways to implement a concentration

  • the merger of 2 or more previously independent companies or parts of companies;
  • the acquisition by 1 or more persons (that already control at least 1 company) or by 1 or more companies of direct or indirect control over 1 or more other companies.
  • other multiple transactions that are conditional on one another or are closely connected are regarded as a single concentration.

Although such operations may have a positive impact on the market, they may also appreciably restrict competition, if they create or strengthen a dominant market player. In order to preclude restrictions of competition, the European Commission exercises control over planned concentrations with an EU dimension (i.e. when the operation extends beyond the borders of an EU country and exceeds certain worldwide and EU-wide turnover thresholds). It may authorise them; authorise subject to conditions; or forbid them.

EU rules for the control of concentrations are found in Regulation (EC) No  139/2004, which entered into force on 1  May 2004. Regulation 139/2004/EC declares that mergers that create significative obstacles to the effective and real competition in the Internal Market; or in a substantial part thereto must be declared non-compatible with the Internal European Market. This regulation is applicable to all concentrations with an EU dimension.

EU rules can apply to all mergers no matter where in the world the merging companies have their registered office, headquarters, activities or production facilities, because even mergers between companies based outside the European Union may affect markets in the EU if the companies do business in the EU.

In determining whether a concentration is compatible with the common market, the Commission takes account on a case-by-case basis of several factors, such as the concepts of ‘EU dimension’, ‘dominant position’, ‘effective competition’ and ‘relevant market’.

The basic criterion used to analyse concentrations is that of a ‘dominant position’
  • One or more firms are said to hold a dominant position if they have the economic power to influence the parameters of competition, especially prices, production, product quality, distribution and innovation, and to limit competition to an appreciable extent.
EU dimension v National dimension
  • A concentration acquires an EU dimension, and therefore it must be notified to the EU Commission, where a number of thresholds related to these companies turnover are met: If the annual turnover of the combined businesses exceeds specified thresholds in terms of global and European market, (etc)
  • Below such thresholds, the national competition authorities -NCA- may review the merger.
  • The European Commission may also examine mergers which are referred to it from the NCA of the EU Member States. This may take place on the basis of a request by the merging companies or by request by the NCA of an EU Member State, or by the Commission own initiative.
  • Under certain circumstances, the European Commission may also refer a case to the NCA of an EU Member State.
Notification procedures in the EU :
  1. As a general rule, concentrations with an EU dimension must be notified to the Commission prior to their implementation (for instance: following the conclusion of the agreement and the announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest).
  2. Regulation 139/2004/EC allows for formal notification before the conclusion of a binding agreement. 
  3. It is also  possible to follow pre-notification procedures:
    • this allows the parties to show to the Commission, for example, that the proposed merger, while resulting in a concentration having a cross-border dimension, affects competition on the market of  only1 EU country. If that EU country does not express disagreement the Commission refer the case to the competent authorities of that EU country with a view to the application of that country’s national competition law.
    • the same procedure applies where a person or an undertaking wishes to draw the Commission’s attention to the cross-border effects which a merger without an EU dimension could have at European level.
EU Commission proceedings: 
  • The Commission is competent to initiate, at its own initiative proceedings: to carry out investigations and to impose fines.
  • If the parties to the concentration act in accordance with Regulation 139/2004/EC, they notify to the Commission as explained above. When the EU Commission receives a notification, it determines by Decision (secondary legislation) whether the notified concentration comes under the regulation, whether it is compatible with the EU internal market; or whether it raises serious doubts as to its compatibility.
    • Concentrations with an EU dimension cannot be implemented either before notification or for 3 weeks following notification. 
    • If a concentration has already been implemented and declared incompatible with the common market, the Commission can order the companies to dissolve the concentration..
  • The Commission examines notified concentrations  to check if they  significantly impede effective competition in the EU.
    • If they do not, they are approved unconditionally with a Commission Decision.
    • If the EU Commission finds that a proposed merger could distort competition, the parties may commit (agree) to taking action to try to correct this likely effect. For example, to sell part of the combined business,  to license technology to another company, etc. If the European Commission is satisfied that the commitments would maintain or restore competition in the market, it gives conditional clearance for the merger to go ahead (Commission Decision). It then monitors whether the merging companies fulfil their commitments and it intervenes if they do not. If no compromise is proposed by the merging firms, the Project will be prohibited
    • The Commission can prohibit the concentration (Commission Decision)
  • To enforce compliance the Commission may impose the following sanctions:
    • fines, not exceeding 1% of the aggregate turnover of the company where:
      • intentionally or negligently, it supplies incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or does not supply information within the required time limit.
      • seals affixed during an inspection have been broken.
      • It can impose fines of up to 10% of the aggregate turnover of the company concerned where, either intentionally or negligently, it fails to notify a concentration prior to its implementation, implements a concentration in breach of the regulation or fails to comply with a Commission Decision.
    • periodic penalty payments: the Commission may impose periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 % of the average daily aggregate turnover of the company for each working day of delay, from the date set by the Commission in its decision requiring information, ordering inspections, etc.
The European Court of Justice can abolish, reduce or increase any fines or periodic penalty payments imposed.

 

Lincoln. Library Tower. High Street. OX
Spain (not in 2019/20)
  • In Spain, our Law on Unfair Competition Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, Ley 15/2007, here-LDC- is based upon a complex definition of merger «concentración» related to the idea of change in the structure of control, either as a matter of fact or as a matter of Law (in accordance with our Company Law applying its criteria to any type of company). The Spanish central idea in mergers policy is that of change in the decision powers /control in a Group. Such idea is compatible with Regulation 139/2004/EC. Spanish Law mentions as possible situations of merger «concentraciones»: Mergers, the acquisition of control by one company over other company, the incorporation of Joint Companies, etc  (this is an open list).

LDC imposes upon companies the obligation to notify to Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores –CNMV- before the merger. It establishes time lapses for the CNMV to reply. If there is no reply the merger is authorised (silencio positivo) . However, until there is a decision or until the time limit has not elapsed, the merger cannot be implemented. LDC offers some 10 criteria to assess whether the merger must or must not be authorised. The main or core criteria is whether (or not) such merger can create obstacles to free competition in Spain

Competition Law and Unfair Competition Law (EU). Antitrust. Notes for IBL

Lesson 3 (I). IBL. Free Competition Law. Antitrust, with special attention to its regulation in the EU (1.1  and 1.2 )

Foreword on Free competition (in the EU)

European competition policy is intended to ensure free and fair competition in the European Union. EU rules on competition (Articles 101 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU) are based on some main principles:

  1. (a and b) prohibition of concerted practices and other agreements and of abuse of a dominant position capable to affect competition within the common market (antitrust rules);
  2. preventive supervision of mergers with a European dimension (i.e. to ensure that the significant size of the proposed merged operation in the EU market would not result in restrict competition, with the prohibition of some mergers;
  3. supervision of aid granted by EU countries which threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods;
    • Also, but beyond this Course
      • the liberalisation of sectors previously controlled by public monopolies, such as telecommunications, transport or energy
      • cooperation with competition authorities outside the EU.

The European Commission and the national competition authorities enforce EU competition rules. The cooperate among themselves within the European Competition Network (ECN), ensures effective and consistent application of the rules.

Find the Dodo in this window…!
1. 1 . Antitrust (illicit agreements/decisions/concerted practices and  abuse of dominant position)
  • Free Competition benefits the market in so far as it encourages the offer of products and services at the most favourable terms for of the participants in that market, as well as the access to products and services under non-discriminatory terms and conditions. To be effective, it requires companies to act independently of each other, and within a market where competitive pressures are exerted by its agents (producers, distributors, financiers, etc) operating in a level playing field. European antitrust policy is based in two central rules in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Unión (Art 101 and Art 102 TFUE); as well as in secondary legislation (mainly Regulation (EU) 1/2003). The main Spanish Law in this area is  Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, Ley 15/2007, here

The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) prohibits antitrust (anti-competitive) behaviour, in the form of agreements, decisions and concerted practices which restrict competition (Article 101), and abuse of dominant positions (Article 102):

  • Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits agreements, decisions and concerted practices between two or more independent market operators which restrict competition. This provision covers both horizontal agreements / decisions /practices (between actual or potential competitors operating at the same level of the supply chain) and vertical agreements (between firms operating at different levels, i.e. agreement between a manufacturer and its distributor).
    • One of the clearest cases of illegal conduct infringing Article 101 is the creation of a «cartel» between competitors, which may involve price-fixing and/or market sharing behaviours, etc.. A cartel is a group (horizontal or vertical) of similar and independent companies which join together to fix prices, to limit production or to share markets or customers between them, or to engage in similar practices.
      • Please note that agreements/decisions/concerted practices may be horizontal (between competitors at the same level of the supply chain fixing prices or limiting production) or vertical (such as between a manufacturer and a distributor).
    • Under Article 101(3) of the TFEU, these prohibited behaviours may be permitted, as an exception, if they generate more positive than negative effects (if they improve production or product distribution, or they promote technical or economic progress, for example), and at the same time:
        1. they allow that some of their benefits reach the consumers
        2. they do not eliminate completely all competition in relation to the products or services affected.
        3. They do not impose on the companies that are a part of the agreement, restrictions which are not indispensable to achieve the positive objectives of the agreement
    • Limited exceptions to Antitrust rules are also provided for by Regulation (Reglamentos).
    • The exemptions can be declared in relation with any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, or any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, or any concerted practice or category of concerted practices. Please visit the European Commission site on Decisions on Exemptions
1 2 Antitrust (Abuse of dominant position)
  • Article 102 of the Treaty prohibits that companies, undertakings or firms that hold a dominant position on a market, abuse such position. Ie, by charging unfair prices, by limiting production, by refusing to innovate to the prejudice of consumers. The main rules on procedures to implement this article (secondary EU Law) are set out in Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003.

 

COMMON PROCEDURES ON ANTITRUST CONTROL (1.1 and 1.2)
    • The Commission may impose large fines on firms for such illegal business practices. Since 2004, national competition authorities can enforce EU antitrust rules on agreements/decisions/practices  (and on dominance abuse) in the same way as the Commission.
    • LENIENCY AGREEMENTS. There are special situations where leniency agreements can be reached between infractors and Competition authorities to minimize the consequences of their infringements: Many cartels are found out as the European Commission successfully carries out its own investigations to detect them. But other cartels have been detected by the European Commission after one of its members confessed and asked for leniency,  Leniency programmes (programas de clemencia) allow for the reduction of penalties.
    • SETTLEMENTS. Also, undertakings can settle their case by acknowledging their involvement in the cartel under investigation,  and thus, getting a smaller fine in return. (See Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases  and  EU Commission Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 in cartel cases)

Authorities that supervise and control Antitrust Law  

  • The EU Commission is empowered by the Treaty to apply antitrust and it has investigative powers (a.e. inspection at business and non-business premises, written requests for information, etc.). The Commission may also impose fines on those undertakings which violate the EU antitrust rules.
  • European Court of Justice is competent in Antitrust EU cases
  • National Competition Authorities (NCAs) such as in Spain the CNMC (Comisión Nacional de Mercados y Competencia) are empowered to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty fully, to ensure that competition is not distorted or restricted.
  • National courts may apply EU and National provisions to protect the individual rights conferred on citizens by the Treaty.
  • Please note: Competition law does not only involve administrative sanctions. It also involves actions for damages before national courts (both stand alone actions and follow up actions).

EU competition laws must be applied coherently throughout the EU.

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Resolución, restructuración bancos. Accionistas v., ayudas de estado. TJUE y contexto BCE

La Sentencia del TJUE de 19 de julio 2016 (Gran Sala) C‑526/14  reconoce que accionistas y titulares de deuda subordinada deben hacerse responsable de los resultados de las entidades y en consecuencia minorizar la importancia de la ayuda estatal que puede ser precisa en procesos de reestructuración. El resumen elaborado por el servicio de prensa de «Curia-TJUE» puede descargarse aquí. "Castillos de Liubliana a través de los árboles, Eslovenia"

A raíz de la crisis financiera mundial de 2007 varios bancos de Eslovenia presentaban un déficit de capital no disponiendo de activos suficientes para pagar a sus acreedores y cubrir sus depósitos.  El Banco Central de Eslovenia adoptó en 2013 medidas extraordinarias para la recapitalización, rescate y liquidación de bancos. La Comisión Europea autorizó ayudas de Estado. El tratamiento distinto a accionistas e inversores de unos y otros bancos motivaron recursos ante el Tribunal Constitucional de Eslovenia (protección del derecho de propiedad, tratamiento y protección de accionistas respecto del mantenimiento del capital social, etc). La cuestión fue elevada en vía prejudicial al TJUE, y de esa importante resolución destacamos:

Y, del fallo:

"Detalle de escultura en Liubliana, Eslovenia"

  1.  La Comunicación de la Comisión sobre la aplicación, a partir del 1 de agosto de 2013, de la normativa sobre ayudas estatales a las medidas de apoyo en favor de los bancos en el contexto de la crisis financiera («Comunicación bancaria»)  no tiene efecto vinculante para los Estados miembros.
  2.  Los artículos 107 TFUE a 109 TFUE  no se oponen a los puntos 40 a 46 de la Comunicación bancaria, en cuanto éstos prevén el reparto de las cargas entre los accionistas y los titulares de instrumentos subordinados para la autorización de una ayuda de Estado.
  3.  El principio de protección de la confianza legítima y el derecho de propiedad deben interpretarse en el sentido de que no se oponen a los puntos 40 a 46 de la Comunicación bancaria, (reparto de las cargas entre los accionistas y los titulares de instrumentos subordinados para la autorización de una ayuda de Estado).
  4.  Los artículos 29, 34, 35 y 40 a 42 de la Directiva 2012/30/UE  (capital, Sociedades anónimas) no se oponen a los puntos 40 a 46 de la Comunicación bancaria.
  5.  La Comunicación bancaria debe interpretarse en el sentido de que las medidas de conversión o de reducción del valor contable de los instrumentos híbridos y de los instrumentos subordinados como las previstas en el punto 44 de esa Comunicación no deben ir más allá de lo necesario para eliminar el déficit de capital del banco.
  6.   El artículo 2, séptimo guion, de la Directiva 2001/24/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 4 de abril de 2001, relativa al saneamiento y a la liquidación de las entidades de crédito, debe interpretarse en el sentido de que se incluyen en el concepto de «medidas de saneamiento», enunciado en esa disposición, las medidas de reparto de las cargas previstas en los puntos 40 a 46 de la Comunicación bancaria.

Esta sentencia reconoce el impacto sobre accionistas y otros inversores de las crisis bancarias,  y se vierte en un asunto en el que existían -y se mantienen- sospechas sobre desigual valoración de activos bancarios por parte de las autoridades de algunos Estados. Podría dar pistas, por su relación con el tema de fondo, sobre  los aún (posibles) rescates a Banca Italiana, (comentario Tapia Hermida); y la necesaria reinterpretación de las ayudas de estado a la banca, ahora que el BCE está poniendo sobre la mesa posibles adquisiciones de activos no productivos.

Post Scriptum . Algo después con más resoluciones TJUE y AN, Profesor Tapia Hermida

«Comentarios desde el GID». Inspecciones de la CNMC. Nota Informativa

Comentarios desde el GID

Junio 2016

 

lupa 

 

A PROPÓSITO DE LA NOTA INFORMATIVA DE LA DIRECCION DE COMPETENCIA DE LA CMNC SOBRE INSPECCIONES

Aquí

María Angustias Díaz Gómez

Catedrática de Derecho Mercantil

Coordinadora del Grupo de Innovación Docente de Derecho Mercantil de la Universidad de León. (GID-DerMerUle)

 

Como es sabido, cuando se produzcan circunstancias que aconsejen inspeccionar las sedes de empresas y/o asociaciones donde presuntamente conste información secreta y confidencial imposible de recabar por otros medios, y que pueda acreditar presuntas infracciones en materia de competencia, el legislador a fin de lograr el cumplimiento de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, faculta a la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) para realizar inspecciones a dichas empresas.

Con el ánimo de lograr la máxima transparencia en esta labor de inspección, la CNMC ha publicado -el 7 de junio de 2016- una “Nota Informativa” sobre este procedimiento de inspección. Al ofrecer esta información detallada del procedimiento, se trata de que las empresas conozcan sus derechos y obligaciones en el caso de producirse una inspección, facilitando asimismo la labor de inspeccionados e inspectores. Leer más

Manipulación de índices de mercado. Work in progress regulatorio. USA/ UE. Mayo 2016

La manipulación de índices de referencia en los mercados está siendo objeto de decisiones recientes para evitar sus nocivos efectos y para mejorar los controles y gobernanza institucional sobre tales manipulaciones en particular en relación con evitar conflictos de intereses con los administradores sociales y gestionarlos adecuadamente; mejorar la calidad de los datos y de la metodología utilizada por los gestores de indices; garantizar que las contribuciones a estos índices y los datos en los que se apoyan se sometan a controles particularmente para evitar conflictos de intereses. también para proteger a los consumidores e inversores que se verán beneficiados por el refuerzo de la transparencia y de los mecanismos de resarcimiento.IMG_20151206_175233058

Seguiremos atentos a más desarrollos

Mercado Único Digital. Industria europea

Llamamos la atención sobre una serie de documentos de la Comisión Europea que acaban de ver la luz -que están relacionados entre ellos- y que configuran la base de la estrategia europea de fomento de la economía industrial- digital, aprovechando los avances en tecnologías como la Internet de las Cosas (IoT), el 5G, la informática en la nube, el análisis de datos y la robótica

  • Por un lado la Comunicación Digitalización de la industria europea Aprovechar todas las ventajas de un mercado único digital, que subraya las líneas generales de una nueva revolución industrial que estamos viviendo, a impulso de las tecnologías digitales  que están cambiando la forma de diseñar, producir, comercializar y generar valor a partir de productos y servicios. Esta Comunicación se enmarca en el proceso cuyo inicio podemos fijar en 2012 con la Iniciativa Europea de Computación en la Nube. que presentó el plan para la creación de una infraestructura en nube y de datos de categoría mundial para la ciencia y la ingeniería, y que proporcionará un entorno virtual con servicios abiertos  para el almacenamiento, la gestión, el análisis y la reutilización de los datos de la investigación  (la «Nube Europea de la Ciencia Abierta»).
  • La Comunicación  «Digitalización de la Industria«, va acompañada de otras  comunicaciones y documentos de trabajo de los servicios de la Comisión como los relativos a informática de alto rendimiento y tecnologías cuánticas.
  • La Comunicación sobre las prioridades para la normalización de las TIC que identifica las normas básicas sobre TIC y presenta medidas para acelerar su desarrollo a fin de apoyar la innovación digital en la economía.
  • El Plan de Acción sobre Administración Electrónica para la transformación digital de los servicios públicos con soluciones en línea, transfronterizas, etc.
  • El documento de trabajo de los servicios de la Comisión sobre la Internet de las Cosas pone de relieve los retos y oportunidades asociados a la IoT en Europa.

Post Scriptum Por su relación destacamos también la entrada del Prof F de la Vega en blog Competencia y Derecho «Aprovechar las oportunidades del mercado único digital» como política de competencia de la Comisión Europea (Informe junio 2016)

Multa europea. Cárteles. Riberebro. Setas y champiñones en conserva

Reciente imposición de  multa  de 5 194 000 euros de la Comisión Europea a Riberebro por su participación en un cartel de setas y champiñones en conserva vendidos en latas y tarros (no frescos ni congelados) para ventas  en el Espacio Económico Europeo (EEE) a través de  subasta a minoristas y mayoristas del sector alimentario (autoservicio y clientes profesionales y empresas de servicios de restauración).

Los miembros del cartel intercambiaron información confidencial sobre ofertas, fijaron precios mínimos, se pusieron de acuerdo sobre objetivos de volumen y se asignaron clientes entre ellos. Así estabilizaban sus cuotas de mercado y limitaban el descenso de los precios. La multa se fijó sobre la base de las Directrices de la Comisión de 2006 sobre multas, y de conformidad con la Comunicación sobre medidas de clemencia de 2006 de la Comisión (Riberebro obtuvo una reducción del 50 % por cooperar con la investigación).

En consecuencia de lo anterior, y de conformidad con la Directiva 2014/104/UE cualquier persona o empresa afectada por el comportamiento contrario a la competencia descrito en este asunto puede acudir a los tribunales de los Estados miembros y reclamar una indemnización por daños y perjuicios.

Más (nota de prensa de la Comisión, 6.04.2016)

Abuso de mercado. Exenciones autoridades de terceros países.

El ReglamIMG_20150906_163315984[1]ento (UE) 596/2014 en relación con operaciones efectuadas en interés público permite, (Art 6, apartado 5) exenciones relativas de información a favor de ciertos organismos públicos encargados de la gestión de la deuda pública, o que intervengan en ella, y a bancos centrales de terceros países cuando cumplan los requisitos pertinentes.

La Comisión elaboró y presentó al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo un informe en el que se evaluaba el tratamiento internacional de los organismos públicos encargados o intervinientes en la gestión de  deuda pública, así como de bancos centrales de terceros países. En consecuencia se determinó la adecuación de ampliar la exención sobre a operaciones, órdenes o conductas de política monetaria, de tipo de cambio o de gestión de la deuda pública, desarrollada por  organismos públicos y bancos centrales de  terceros países.

El reciente  Reglamento Delegado (UE) 2016/522 de la Comisión, de 17 de diciembre de 2015, por el que se completa el Reglamento (UE) nº 596/2014   determina el ámbito de exención relativa a algunos bancos centrales y organismos públicos de terceros países (Anexo 1), indicadores de manipulación de mercado, umbrales de divulgación de información privilegiada, autoridad competente para notificaciones de retrasos en la difusión pública de información privilegiada, condiciones para autorización de negociación durante períodos limitados y los tipos de operaciones de notificación obligatoria realizadas por los directivos.

Nuevos modelos de negocio. Eliminación de barreras de entrada. El fundamental papel de la CNMC

La sociedad del conocimiento y la colaboración está permitiendo la puesta en marcha de nuevos modelos de negocio que,  sin perjuicio de posibles patologías jurídicas concretas que van siendo sancionadas por los Tribunales, precisan del apoyo del ordenamiento en aspectos cruciales para su sostenibilidad. He aquí, por ejemplo, la cuestión relativa a la eliminación de barreras de entrada y  en general la garantía de que estos operadores novedosos no se vean superados por una inapropiada aplicación  o incluso por la vulneración de los principios de libre competencia.IMG_20150104_121116829[1]

La CNMC (enlaces a los que remitimos) ha realizado ya algunas actuaciones pioneras en este ámbito, en sectores como el de los taxis, la adecuación del Real Decreto de Transporte Terrestre, o  normativas autonómicas relativas a los bienes inmuebles de alquiler para uso turístico 

  • En efecto, la ley 3/2013, de 4 de junio, de creación de la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (particularmente su Art. 5,4 ) y el artículo 27 de la Ley 20/2013, de 9 de diciembre, de garantía de la unidad de mercado (LGUM). permiten a la CNMC  actuar de oficio, (normalmente) como último recurso ante situaciones de especial gravedad para la competencia efectiva. Así, por ejemplo, la CNMC puede solicitar ante los Tribunales la suspensión de la norma impugnada.
  • Además, conforme al Art. 27 de la LGUM, la CNMC puede actuar  a solicitud de un operador económico, y estaría obligada a hacerlo si el acto o norma contra el que pretende dirigirse el operador  es contrario a los principios de la LGUM, subrayándose los efectos suspensivos automáticos de la norma impugnada cuando ésta ha sido solicitada por la CNMC.

Remitimos a la explicación ofrecida por la propia CNMV en su blog, con la entrada titulada  «La impugnación de normas como instrumento para eliminar barreras a la economía colaborativa y a las nuevas plataformas de servicios por internet» .

  • En este contexto, llamamos la atención sobre la consulta pública de la CNMV sobre economía colaborativa y nuevos modelos de negocio, de la que hemos tenido noticia gracias al Blog del Profesor Luis Cazorla, (aquí) quien desde hace ya algún tiempo viene comentando algunos de los principales negocios colaborativos conocidos actualmente, como Blablacar, o Uber, entre otros aquí; como sin duda una búsqueda en su blog permite identificar.
  • De especial interés, el blog ecolaborativa, con entradas y referencias comparadas a las autoridades supervisoras de la competencia en este tipo de modelo aquí
  • Infoautónomos-El economista